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Introduction 
John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is the most influential 
methodology in contemporary ethics. This paper argues that this influence is 
undeserved. Rawls’ method is highly implausible. Worse, it is also incapable of 
performing the work that motivates the search for a moral methodology in the 
first place. These are bold charges, and I dedicate the bulk of the paper to 
substantiating them (§§3-5). Several of the objections that I offer have been 
pressed before. However, when such objections are pressed in isolation from 
each other, it can seem easy to salvage the spirit (if not the letter) of the 
method, by judicious adjustment. It is much more difficult to do this once the 
inadequacies of the method are systematically displayed. I illustrate this point 
by exploring salient attempts to salvage the spirit of reflective equilibrium by 
abandoning elements of Rawls’ approach (§6). I argue that none of these 
attempts succeed. I conclude that appeal to the method of reflective 
equilibrium is not a helpful means of addressing pressing methodological 
questions in ethics.  In a slogan, reflective equilibrium is methodologically 
irrelevant.  
                                                   
* I am indebted to an audience at Virginia Tech, to participants in Sarah McGrath’s 
Systematic Ethics seminar at Princeton, and to Chris Daly for helpful comments on this 
project. I also benefited from comments on a distant ancestor of this paper in the 
Dissertation Seminar at Princeton. This paper draws in places on ideas previously 
published in my (2009) and (2012).   
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1. Desiderata for moral methodologies 
This section and the next provide the background for my critical discussion. 
The core task of this section is to introduce and motivate three desiderata that 
I will use to evaluate Rawls’ methodology. I begin by characterizing a 
philosophical methodology, and asking how we could motivate methodological 
enquiry in philosophy.  
It will be useful to treat a philosophical methodology as consisting of 
two elements. The first is a method: a set of instructions or prescriptions for 
accomplishing some philosophical goal. The second is a methodological theory: 
this is a theory that purports to support adopting the method in question. We 
can think of the method of reflective equilibrium, strictly, as a method in the 
above sense. I will introduce this method in the next section. Rawls’ 
methodological theory is the broader framework within which Rawls 
characterizes and defends this method in A Theory of Justice and The 
Independence of Moral Theory. I will introduce and discuss elements of this 
theory in §§3-5.  
Focus on methodology in philosophy is controversial. For example, one 
might think of a method as a set of instructions that must have the following 
property: that someone who understands them can always tell whether she is 
following them. Timothy Williamson has recently argued that a method, so 
understood, is impossible (2008). Williamson’s conclusion is controversial, but 
the best way for the methodologist to reply is perhaps to reject the conception 
of methodology that Williamson targets. A method could be highly informative 
and useful even if it is not luminous in this sense.   
A simpler challenge to focusing on methodology begins by noting that 
the methodological question “How should we investigate the nature of justice?” 
is less intrinsically interesting than the substantive ethical question “What is 
justice?” One might try to meet this challenge by suggesting that focusing on 
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methodology is a good way of making progress on answering substantive 
ethical questions. But this in turn might seem to rest on Cartesian fantasies 
about philosophers’ distinctively methodological competence.   
Investigation into methodology, however, can be motivated in at least 
two ways that do not require such fantasies. First, suppose there are serious 
challenges to the very possibility of successful enquiry in a domain. In this case, 
methodological theory might be important as a way of assessing or answering 
such existential threats. Second, suppose that central substantive 
disagreements in a domain can be traced back to the differing methods being 
deployed by the disagreeing parties. This motivates pursuing the substantive 
disagreement back to its source, and seeking to adjudicate between those 
competing methods. These motivations gather strength in proportion to the 
plausibility of the two suppositions. There is a good case to be made for both 
suppositions in ethics. Consider a brief sketch of each case, in turn.  
Perhaps the most familiar approach to normative ethical theorizing 
centrally involves the appeal to intuitions about possible cases. However, there 
is vigorous disagreement regarding the role that such intuitions should play in 
our ethical theorizing. Is it unavoidable?1 To be avoided at all costs?2 Should we 
appeal only to real or realistic cases? Or can we appeal with abandon to elegant 
but outlandish scenarios?3 Should intuitive judgments about cases be given 
priority over other intuitive judgments, such as judgments concerning the 
plausibility of principles, or concerning the moral significance of certain kinds 
                                                   
1 It is often presupposed that in ethics and other areas of philosophy, appeal to intuition 
plays a central and possibly ineliminable justificatory role (see for example Kagan 2001, p. 
44). This presupposition has recently been challenged by (Williamson 2007) and (Cappelen 
2012). The nature of intuitions is itself a controversial issue. For a variety of views 
concerning the nature and significance of intuitions, see (DePaul and Ramsey, 1998). 
2 Representative worries about ethical intuitions can be found in (Hare 1981, p. 130ff) and 
(Singer 2005).  
3 Worries about the philosophical use of imaginary cases are suggested by (Dancy 1985) and 
(Wilkes 1988). Suspicion about appeal to unrealistic cases is widespread but rarely 
defended in detail.  
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of properties, or concerning the significance of certain theoretical desiderata?4 
Finally, can we augment or even supplant the appeal to intuition by producing 
empirical results that bear on normative ethical theses?5  
These disputes (and many other like them) have substantive bite. To 
take just one example, a methodology that privileged plausible general 
principles over case-specific judgments (especially those about outlandish 
cases) would make it much easier to defend standard forms of 
consequentialism, and much harder to defend the sorts of complex 
deontological principles proposed by Frances Kamm (2006). 
Next consider four representative (but far from exhaustive) anxieties 
about ethical enquiry, which might appear to cast doubt on our ability to 
successfully engage in it. First, ethical enquiry appears to contrast strikingly – 
both in terms of methods and cumulative success – with our scientific 
paradigms of successful enquiry.6 This casts doubt on whether substantial 
theoretical success in ethics is possible. Second, disagreement in ethics is deep, 
pervasive, and seemingly intractable. This naturally prompts the question of 
whether we are simply incompetent to answer controversial ethical questions 
(compare McGrath 2008). Third, philosophers have worried loudly about the 
distinctive vulnerability of our moral beliefs to emotional influence,7 to 
                                                   
4 See (Huemer 2008) for principled defense of an unusual assessment of the relative 
significance of different types of intuitions. Appeals to the plausibility of moral principles 
are perhaps as old as ethics. Appeals to the moral (ir)relevance of certain properties and to 
theoretical desiderata are perhaps less familiar. For an example, consider (Unger 1996), 
which follows (Singer 1972) in appealing to the intuitive idea that mere physical proximity 
cannot be a morally relevant property. The appeal of theoretical desiderata like simplicity 
and explanatory power helps to explain why we have seen so many efforts to work out 
normative theories that explain everything about morality in consequentialist or 
deontological or aretaic terms. Rossians and particularists, of course, argue that these 
desiderata are not decisive. See for example (McNaughton 2003). 
5 A good (if now dated) point of entry into this burgeoning empirical literature is (Doris 
and Stich 2006).  
6 Many challenges to ethics, such as the familiar thought that ethical commitment is in 
tension with a ‘disenchanted’ modern worldview, presuppose this contrast. The idea that 
there is a methodological constrast between ethics and science has been challenged, for 
example by (Boyd 1997 §4.4).  
7 See, for example (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, §9.4.3). 
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rationalization of our existing in-group lifestyles,8 or to evolutionary 
pressures.9 These complement more traditional anxieties about ideological 
influence.10 Together, these constitute a laundry list of apparently ethically 
arbitrary factors that are arguably implicated in the formation of our beliefs 
about ethics. Finally, many of us take ethical enquiry to aim to discover ethical 
facts, not to create them. Yet, when answering the most fundamental ethical 
questions, it can at least appear to be more appropriate to think hard than to go 
look. This raises the familiar but nonetheless deep question of how we can 
hope to discover objective facts about the world from the armchair. 
These anxieties complement each other. For example, our apparent 
sensitivity to untrustworthy inputs might be used to explain persistent ethical 
disagreement. This explanation would in turn make the armchair distinctively 
less comfortable in ethics than it is in mathematics (for example), where 
ideology and emotion have less incentive for purchase, and disagreement is 
less endemic.11 Likewise, in the absence of a positive story about armchair 
reliability, such sensitivity becomes a potentially damning explanation for the 
striking contrast between ethical enquiry and paradigms of successful scientific 
enquiry.     
The points just sketched motivate the project of moral methodology. 
The scope and substantive significance of controversy in moral methodology 
provides rich opportunities for ‘dialectical ascent’ from ethical to 
methodological disagreement. And the force of the representative anxieties 
should prompt interest in methodology, in order to explore whether ethical 
enquiry can actually attain its goals.  
These points also suggest natural desiderata by which we can assess 
candidate methodological theories in ethics: 
                                                   
8 The locus classicus here is (Mackie 1977, p. 36). 
9 See, among many recent discussions, (Joyce 2006, ch. 6).  
10 See (Railton 2012, essay 12) for helpful discussion of the challenge from ideology. 
11 But see (Clarke-Doane forthcoming) for a defense of the comparative epistemological 
plausibility of moral as opposed to mathematical realism. 
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Vindication  does the candidate methodological theory 
address the central challenges to the 
possibility of successful ethical enquiry? 
Adjudication  does the candidate methodological theory 
purport to resolve the central controversies 
within moral methodology? 
Plausibility  are the distinctive features of the methodology 
plausible in the face of objection? 
Plausibility is a central desideratum on any philosophical theory: a theory 
that cannot be adequately defended does not deserve our allegiance. 
Vindication and Adjudication are desiderata that reflect the two motives for 
engaging in moral methodology just sketched. If what I have suggested above 
is correct, a moral methodology that fails to meet these desiderata to any 
significant degree thereby fails to accomplish the tasks that warrant attention 
to moral methodology in the first place. In light of this, I will adopt these 
desiderata as the criteria against which we should assess Rawls’ methodology. I 
now turn to introducing that methodology.  
   
2. Rawlsian hopes 
In this section, I sketch some of the distinctive elements of Rawls’ method of 
reflective equilibrium (hereafter, for brevity: Rawls’ method, or the method). I 
then illustrate the sketch by explaining how Rawls understands the method’s 
role in one of his own central arguments. With this preliminary 
characterization in hand, I suggest reasons for initial optimism concerning 
Rawls’ ability to meet the desiderata introduced in the preceding section.  
 We can isolate two structural components of the method of reflective 
equilibrium, suggested by Rawls’ canonical account in A Theory of Justice.12 The 
first is an account of the central inputs to be drawn on in moral theorizing, and 
                                                   
12 Rawls offers a distinct (and inferior) precursor to the method in his (1951). For a brief 
criticism of one feature of that precursor, see my (2012, p. 532).  
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the second is an account of the operations to be performed with those inputs. 
The central inputs to the method are what Rawls dubs considered judgments 
about moral matters: those judgments one sincerely and stably affirms in 
conditions which minimize the influence of strong emotion or self-interest 
(1999b, p. 42). The operations begin by formulating what one takes to be 
plausible moral principles, which purport to explain the ethical theses 
expressed by one’s considered judgments. Because it is typically very difficult 
to find plausible principles that adequately explain the full range of one’s 
considered judgments, the method then requires that one attempt to fit these 
judgments and principles into a coherent scheme.13 One does this by 
modifying, adding, or abandoning principles or particular judgments as one 
deems appropriate on reflection (1999b, p. 18). Finally, during this process, one 
is also supposed to take into consideration the leading theories on the topic, 
and the arguments that can be made in support of each (cf. 1999b, p. 43).   
The method can be helpfully illustrated by a canonical use that Rawls 
puts it to: his explanation of the justification of his conception of the original 
position in A Theory of Justice (1999b, p. 17-18). As a contractualist, Rawls 
distinguishes two sorts of broadly moral principles: substantive principles that 
characterize ideally just institutions, and procedural principles that 
characterize the contractual procedure that generates the substantive 
principles. Rawls introduces the method after having explained the idea of 
procedural justification of principles via an idealized contractual situation that 
he calls the ‘original position’.  
Rawls explains that in using the method in this case, we seek 
equilibrium between our considered judgments about justice on the one hand, 
and the contractual procedure (and the principles this procedure generates) on 
                                                   
13 I have formulated this in individualistic terms. However, Rawls himself often prefers to 
talk of what ‘we’ do. The characterization of the method in his (1951) suggests taking this 
seriously: there he emphasizes the role of the shared judgments of the set of ‘competent 
judges’. However, Rawls’ characterization of moral theory (discussed in the next section) 
strongly suggests that in the mature version of the method, each individual is a potentially 
distinct object of investigation.  
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the other, making adjustments to each as seems intuitively best (1999b, p. 18). 
The contractual machinery is in turn supposed to reflect our considered 
judgments about just procedures. Thus, principles have some claim to be 
adequate principles of justice because they would be agreed to in the original 
position (1999b, p. 17). However, if an otherwise plausible account of the 
original position delivered principles that produced repugnant results when 
applied, it would be substantively unacceptable. So the description of the 
contractual situation is apt for adjustment not only in light of our procedural 
judgments, but also in light of its implications for our judgments about 
substantive justice.   
 This sketched application makes the use of Rawls’ method appear 
familiar. It also appears to provide reason for optimism concerning the three 
desiderata introduced in the previous section.  
First, Rawls’ methodological theory appears to be provide 
Adjudication, at least assuming that it supports the method just sketched. 
Consider some examples. The role of considered moral judgments in the 
method seems to reject priority for either case-specific judgments, or moral 
principles.14 This is because, as Rawls emphasizes, considered judgments are 
possible at all levels of generality (1999a, p. 289). Further, there is no automatic 
privileging of judgments about realistic cases (or, conversely, of judgments 
about outlandish cases). Finally, the method identifies considered moral 
judgments as the privileged inputs to moral enquiry. This contrasts with views 
that require that moral enquiry begins with our intuitions, at least if intuitions 
are construed as psychological states distinct from beliefs. All of this adds up to 
a considerable appearance of methodological substance.  
 We can also make a seemingly strong indirect case for the Plausibility 
of Rawls’ methodology. Moral philosophers are credible judges of the 
plausibility of a moral methodology. And it is remarkably common for such 
                                                   
14 This is somewhat controversial; for example (Singer 1974, p. 516-7) charges that Rawls’ 
method de facto advantages particular moral judgments over general principles.  
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philosophers to endorse the method. Two especially ambitious examples 
illustrate the strength of that endorsement. First, Michael Smith suggests that 
Rawls’ account of the method successfully systematizes our methodological 
platitudes (1994, p. 40). Second, Shelly Kagan suggests that all practicing 
normative theorists are at least implicitly committed to something very similar 
to the method (1998, p. 16).   
So far, we have considered only Rawls’ proposed method, and not the 
broader methodological theory that underlies it. One might hope that this 
theory would substantially address some of the pressing challenges to the 
possibility of successful ethical enquiry, and thereby provide Vindication.     
Such are the hopes that one might entertain for the methodological 
significance of the method of reflective equilibrium. In the next three sections, 
I explore several crucial aspects of Rawls’ broader methodological theory. I 
argue that understanding this theory forces us to abandon each of the three 
hopes entertained here.  
 
3. Against Vindication: Rawls on moral theory 
A methodological theory should provide a conception of the theoretical project 
that a given method is suited to accomplishing. Rawls characterizes the 
method of reflective equilibrium primarily as a means of engaging in what he 
calls moral theory (1999b, §9; 1999a, p. 288). In this section, I explain the role of 
moral theory in Rawls’ account, and argue that it fails to enable Rawls’ 
methodology to meet the Vindication desideratum.   
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls describes moral theory as (roughly) the 
project of describing our ‘moral capacity’ (1999b, p. 41). Moral theory is part of 
a broader domain of enquiry that Rawls calls moral philosophy, which includes 
the way that moral enquiry intersects with the theory of meaning, 
epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind (1999a, p. 287). In The 
Independence of Moral Theory Rawls explains his conception of moral theory in 
more detail. Moral theory is the study of ‘substantive moral conceptions’ which 
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aims to systematically compare those conceptions (1999a, pp. 286; 290-1). 
Strikingly, when engaging in moral theory, we ‘…put aside the idea of 
constructing a correct theory of right and wrong…’ (1999a, p. 288). Thus, when 
studying one’s own moral conception as a moral theorist, one must treat it 
simply as an aspect of human psychology (ibid.). So understood, moral theory 
in Rawls’ special sense is a far cry from normative ethics as it is ordinarily 
understood. The former consists in normatively detached psychological 
investigation, while the latter is a normatively committed attempt to answer 
substantive ethical questions.  
The fact that reflective equilibrium is proposed as a method for 
engaging in moral theory suggests that the goal of the method is to enable us 
to understand and systematically compare those moral conceptions that are 
psychologically realized in humans. This psychological conception of the goal 
of the method might appear to provide Rawls with a quick reply to the 
methodological challenges that apparently face ethical theorizing (such as 
those mentioned in §1 above). For example, consider the challenges based in 
pervasive and seemingly intractable disagreement, or those based on the 
apparent sensitivity of our moral thinking to untrustworthy inputs. Both of 
these challenges take their force from the idea that they undermine our 
reasons to believe that our moral judgments are true. But the discussion of 
moral theory suggests that Rawls’ method aims at understanding our moral 
conceptions, and not evaluating their correctness. Treating the ethical theorist 
as engaging in Rawlsian moral theory might thus seem to inoculate her against 
these challenges, and hence suggest that the Rawlsian methodology provides 
Vindication. Provided that Rawls’ method permits us to accurately 
characterize our moral sensibilities, the reliability of those sensibilities in 
latching onto alleged objective truth is irrelevant to the success of the method.  
This is the only basis on which one might hope to show that Rawlsian 
methodology provides Vindication. But it faces a difficult dilemma. Is 
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describing our moral sensibilities the Rawlsian’s theoretical goal, or merely a 
(possibly necessary) step along the way to achieving that goal?   
Rawls himself appears to favor the second horn of this dilemma. Thus, 
in Independence… Rawls’ case for the significance of moral theory amounts 
largely to the conjecture that progress in moral theory may be an essential 
propaedeutic to broader progress in moral philosophy (1999a, p. 291, cf. also p. 
287).15 And this possibility helps to account for the philosophical interest of 
moral theory in the first place. If we follow Rawls here, however, investigation 
of moral theory merely postpones the challenges to the possibility of successful 
ethical enquiry, rather than answering them. The challenges arise again, as 
soon as the Rawlsian begins to investigate the correctness of the contents of an 
ethical thesis. And here, the method appears to have nothing distinctive to say. 
On this horn of the dilemma, then, Rawls’ methodological theory simply fails 
to meet the Vindication desideratum: it says nothing one way or the other 
about whether or how challenges to the possibility of successful ethical enquiry 
can be met.   
This suggests that we should explore the first horn of the dilemma: the 
idea that understanding our moral sensibilities is the ethical enquirer’s central 
goal. This idea should engender immediate suspicion, since most practicing 
normative ethicists would be indignant at the claim that they are seeking only 
to explore their own psychologies.   
David Copp has recently defended a deflationary conception of the goal 
of normative ethical theorizing that might seem to help the Rawlsian address 
this suspicion. Copp introduces a technical term: the proximate goal of work in 
a discipline. It is definitive of a proximate goal that it is the metric against 
which candidate methods within a discipline should be assessed (2012, p. 22). 
                                                   
15 This point is crucial to interpreting certain passages in Rawls. For example: ‘There is a 
definite if limited class of facts against which conjectured [moral] principles can be 
checked, namely our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.’ (1999b, p. 44). This 
might seem to suggest a simple response-dependent metaphysics of ethics. However, it is 
best read instead as making a claim about doing moral theory, not about the final stages of 
moral enquiry.   
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Copp argues further that practitioners within a discipline must be able to tell 
whether they are accomplishing the proximate goal, by their efforts within that 
discipline (2012, p. 23). On this basis, Copp argues that characterizing our 
moral sensibility as it would be in reflective equilibrium is the proximate goal 
of normative ethical theorizing (2012, pp. 12-15, especially p. 13).  
Copp’s argument, if successful, would permit the Rawlsian to claim that 
their methodology achieves Vindication. This is because on Copp’s account, 
the adequacy of methods must be assessed against the proximate goal, and as 
we have seen, taking our goal to be to characterize our moral sensibility 
appears to undercut the applicability of the central challenges to ethical 
enquiry.  
Copp’s argument, however, rests on a highly implausible assumption: 
that the goal relative to which methods in a discipline can be assessed must also 
be one that practitioners can tell whether they are accomplishing, by their efforts 
within that discipline. This assumption can be shown to be unwarranted by 
example. Suppose that you attempt to debunk my astrological theories by 
appealing to evidence from astrophysics and psychology. It would be absurd 
for me to protest that your criticisms are inert, because the success of my 
astrological theorizing must be something that I can determine by doing 
astrology!16 Astrology is an example of a hopeless discipline: one whose goals 
are not achievable by using the characteristic methods of that discipline. The 
most dramatic challenges to ethical enquiry suggest that it is hopeless in this 
way.  
If this is right, the normative ethicist cannot rest content with the goal 
of characterizing our moral sensibilities. And this means that Rawls’ focus on 
moral theory at best postpones, rather than answers, the most serious 
                                                   
16 The same point arguably holds for successful disciplines. Consider a controversial but 
plausible view in the philosophy of science. On this view, science has realist aims, but 
determining whether science achieves those aims – e.g. by assessing ‘pessimistic induction’ 
and ‘no miracles’ arguments – is something that requires philosophical rather than 
scientific investigation. I am indebted to Chris Daly for a variant of this example.   
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methodological challenges to the project of ethical theorizing. In light of this, 
Rawls’ methodological theory does nothing to show that ethical enquiry is not 
hopeless, and hence does not meet the Vindication desideratum for moral 
methodologies. 
 
4. Against Adjudication: Rawls on wide reflective equilibrium 
Unlike the initial hopes that Rawlsian methodology could provide 
Vindication, the initial case that it can provide Adjudication appeared 
substantial. As we saw in §2, the heart of the method is an account of the 
inputs to ethical theorizing (the considered moral judgments), and an account 
of the operations one is to perform on those inputs. And both of these 
elements appear to provide substantive guidance. In this section, I argue that 
further elements of Rawls’ methodological theory show this appearance to be 
misleading. To see this, we need to further understand the relationship 
between the method and its (provisional) goal.  
As we have seen, Rawls’ characterization of the goal of the method is 
psychological: it is to characterize our moral sensibilities. This might seem to 
render puzzling his suggestion that we should use the method to pursue this 
goal. After all, it is natural to think that the ordinary methods of social science 
would be much more appropriate to investigating the target psychological 
facts.  
This challenge can be mitigated by further clarifying the goal of moral 
theory. Rawls suggests that, if we are ‘philosophically motivated’, our goal will 
not be to characterize our actual sensibilities. Rather, the sensibility that we 
are interested in as moral theorists is one that has been idealized: one in which 
the agent’s sensibility is in wide reflective equilibrium. This equilibrium is a 
state of harmony between the particular judgments and general principles held 
by an agent after that agent has been presented with all candidate ethical 
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theories, and all reasonable arguments for (and, one assumes, against) each of 
them (1999b, p. 43; 1999a, p. 289).17  
 Rawls does not explain why this idealization constitutes an especially 
apt target for philosophical investigation. I offer two conjectures. First, a non-
idealized moral psychology might tend to be a theoretically uninteresting 
mess. By contrast, a moral conception in wide reflective equilibrium will (by 
hypothesis) be coherent, and might be hoped to display interesting theoretical 
structure. Second, a non-ideal moral psychology might be highly dialectically 
unstable: for example, I might be one reasonable argument away from radically 
altering my ethical views. By contrast, a psychology in wide reflective 
equilibrium has a stable moral view that has resulted from careful 
consideration of all reasonable arguments. In light of this, such a psychology is 
dialectically invulnerable: it will be impossible to convince someone in wide 
reflective equilibrium out of their moral view simply by presenting them with a 
reasonable moral argument, because they will, by hypothesis already have 
carefully considered it en route to arriving at their view. 
In light of its extraordinarily idealized character, wide reflective 
equilibrium is not a state that an ordinary human could ever be in. This 
precludes at least direct investigation of this state by scientific psychological 
methods. This might seem to mitigate the puzzle that I mentioned above: 
social scientific investigation of the target facts is not a serious competitor to 
Rawls’ method, because it is not possible.  
One might object that scientific investigation into how our psychologies 
actually work is nonetheless a potentially invaluable step in attempting to 
theorize how these psychologies would work in ideal circumstances. Consider 
one highly speculative example. Our moral conceptions might turn out to 
typically be organized as Roschian prototype clusters, or as connectionist 
systems, as opposed to structures that are well described in terms of moral 
                                                   
17 Rawls only dubs this goal ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ in his (1999a), but it is clear he is 
talking about the same state in his (1999b). 
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principles.18 If so, understanding these psychological facts might be essential 
information for the moral theorist. On the one hand, a reasonable default 
presumption is that the idealized form of a moral conception would share the 
basic structure with its non-idealized analogue. In this case, knowledge of the 
psychological structure of our actual moral thought could substantially inform 
moral theory. On the other hand, one might argue that a prototype 
organization (for example) is for some reason unacceptably non-ideal. In this 
case, knowledge of our actual psychological structure might provide important 
reasons to reject certain moral judgments (say: judgments about non-
paradigmatic cases) as artifacts arising from the allegedly unacceptable 
structure.19 
The Rawlsian has a compelling reply to this objection: if the objector is 
correct about the significance of such scientific investigation for moral theory, 
then the method of reflective equilibrium commends us to engage in such 
investigation. This is because, as we have seen, the method commends us to 
consider all moral conceptions, and all reasonable arguments for each of them. 
And the objector is exactly proposing that there will likely be reasonable 
arguments in favor of moral conceptions (as descriptions of what a psychology 
would accept in wide reflective equilibrium) that appeal in part to empirically 
discoverable facts about psychological structure. 
This is a fair reply. Unfortunately, the logic of this reply can be 
generalized to undercut the claim that the method of reflective equilibrium 
Adjudicates central methodological controversies in ethics. To begin to see 
why, consider a single vivid example. Josh Greene (2008) has drawn on a range 
of empirical work to argue that the psychological provenance of our 
characteristically deontological ethical judgments debunks deontological 
ethics as an objectionable bit of post-hoc rationalization. Set aside whether this 
                                                   
18 See for example (Rosch 1978) and (Bechtel 1987) respectively. 
19 For relevant discussion of the commitments of reflective equilibrium with respect to 
theoretical structure in ethics, see (Schroeter 2004).  
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argument is sound (it is not). It nonetheless surely has some claim to be 
reasonable. And if so, it will be a required input to reflective equilibrium.  
This case illustrates a general lesson. Consider any of the controversies 
within moral methodology that I mentioned in §1. There are surely reasonable 
(even if incorrect) views on both sides of these controversies. And these 
methodological views can potentially be used to mount arguments for or 
against substantive moral theses (this is why accomplishing Adjudication is a 
central motive for engaging in moral methodology). But this in turn means 
that the method must embrace such arguments as legitimate inputs to the 
process of reflective equilibrium. Notice further that this applies as well to 
methodological arguments that challenge the features that initially appeared 
distinctive of the method: the characterization of legitimate starting points, 
and of the operations one is to perform with those starting points. For 
example, Greene’s argument, if accepted, would screen off our deontological 
considered judgments as illegitimate inputs.   
In short, in light of suggesting that the ideal moral enquirer consider all 
reasonable arguments, the method of reflective equilibrium fails to Adjudicate 
the central controversies within moral methodology. Rather, it in effect absorbs 
all such controversies, as inputs. This undercuts any claim that the method 
provides an informative answer to pressing methodological questions in ethics. 
Note that this is true even holding as fixed Rawls’ project of moral theory; how 
we should proceed if and when we attempt to move from moral theory to 
actually defending answers to ethical questions is even less clear.  
 
5. The Implausibility of Rawlsian methodology 
So far, I have argued that Rawlsian methodology fails to Vindicate ethical 
theorizing in the face of challenge, and that it fails to Adjudicate central 
controversies within moral methodology. These results are disappointing, but 
they are compatible with a certain attenuated role for the Rawlsian 
methodology. It might be claimed to provide a very broad methodological 
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framework that we have good reason to accept, and within which more 
substantive investigation of the Vindication and Adjudication questions 
must be carried out. In this section I argue that it would be a mistake to grant 
Rawlsian methodolgy even this limited role. The previous two sections have 
emphasized the limits to the methodological substance of Rawls’ account. In 
this section, I argue that the substance that remains – both in Rawls’ method, 
and in his theoretical rationale for adopting it – should be rejected.20  
 I begin with Rawls’ theoretical rationale. As we have seen, Rawls 
motivates the deployment of the method of reflective equilibrium by appealing 
to the philosophical interest of psychologies that are in the ideal state of wide 
reflective equilibrium. An idealized psychology is supposed to reach wide 
reflective equilibrium by deploying the method. And Rawls appears to assume 
that this motivates our deploying the method as a way of investigating what 
that ideal state would be like. However, this assumed connection between the 
ideal and the wisdom of our use of the method is far from obvious. The 
literature on non-ideal theory in political philosophy has taught us that our 
actual circumstances may require quite different norms than those that would 
apply in ideal circumstances. Consider a non-ethical example: an ideal 
psychology – one with no computational limits – could play perfect chess by 
considering every branch in the tree of possible variations. But the average 
chess player would do miserably worse than usual by trying to mimic this 
algorithm.  
A deeper worry about Rawls’ appeal to wide reflective equilibrium is 
that there is likely no such thing as the set of principles that I would accept in 
wide reflective equilibrium. The core worry here is that idealization can be 
                                                   
20 Considerations of space preclude detailed examination of the plausibility of the role that 
Rawls gives to moral theory. This is dubious on at least two grounds. First, Rawls give no 
adequate defense of the ‘priority’ of moral theory over other questions in moral philosophy 
(for relevant discussion, see my (2012)). Second, Rawls’ morally detached conception of the 
project of moral theory is ill-defended and unappealing. See (Scanlon 2003, p. 142-8) for an 
‘interpretation’ of Rawls which abandons this feature. This interpretation appears to be 
motivated largely by Scanlon’s recognition that it would make Rawlsian methodology more 
worthy of our attention. 
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expected to be path dependent: such that the order in which novel arguments 
(for example) are presented to a subject can substantially affect the outcome of 
idealization. If the idealization process leading to wide reflective equilibrium is 
substantially path-dependent, there might be no determinate fact about what I 
would believe in wide reflective equilibrium. Instead, there would only be facts 
about what I would believe if I reached equilibrium by this route rather than 
that one.21  
Rawls’ account is dispositional in nature: it asks us to consider how our 
psychologies would evolve, given reflection on the relevant information. This 
fact makes path-dependence worries even more pressing. For psychologists 
claim to have found significant order effects in how people evaluate certain 
ethical thought experiments. That is, they claim that we will tend to provide 
different ethical evaluations of certain pairs of thought experiments, depending 
on which of the pair they are asked to think about first (Petrinovich and 
O’Neill 1996; Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012). 
Consider the vastly many different sequences in which I could be 
provided with the total set of reasonable ethical arguments and asked to make 
my moral judgments coherent. Path-dependence suggests that it is very 
plausible that these sequences will not converge on a single ethical theory, or 
even on a cluster of similar theories. This is a serious problem for Rawls’ 
assumption that the method is a means of ascertaining what we would believe 
in wide reflective equilibrium. If there is no unique fact of the matter about 
what we would believe in such a state, then this assumption rests on a false 
presupposition.    
I now turn from Rawls’ methodological theory to the method itself, 
arguing that it allows our dispositions an implausibly central role. Dispositions 
enter into the method in two places. First, the characterization of the inputs to 
the method (considered moral judgments) is dispositional. These judgments 
                                                   
21 In formal updating models, such path-dependence worries are quite compelling: 
updating procedures that are not path-dependent typically exhibit other objectionable 
features. For relevant discussion, see (Bonevac 2004).  
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are (inter alia) those made confidently, and without hesitation in certain 
circumstances (1999b, p. 42). Second, Rawls’ characterization of adjustment 
and equilibrium are dispositional. As Rawls says (discussing a particular 
example): ‘Reflective equilibrium requires only that the agent make these 
revisions with conviction and confidence, and continues to affirm these 
principles when it comes to accepting their consequences in practice’ (1999a, p. 
289). Both of these roles for dispositions are very hard to defend.  
The dispositional criterion of considered moral judgments means that 
the method can endorse intuitively monstrous judgments as appropriate 
starting points for normative theorizing, provided these judgments are held 
with the right sort of dispositions (Kelly and McGrath 2010, p. 346-8). Some 
philosophers may shrug this worry off; perhaps substantive content is not the 
right criterion for assessing a theoretical starting point. Such philosophers 
might be less comfortable countenancing considered moral judgments that 
insist on the significance of obviously arbitrary considerations, or 
considerations that violate plausible formal constraints. But we can imagine 
someone confidently and stably judging that pain is bad – except on a future 
Tuesday, or denying the transitivity of the morally better than relation.22 
Pretheoretical possession of such judgments would arguably constitute 
evidence of moral idiocy, not the basis for an unusual but credible moral 
perspective.  
A similar point applies to the role of dispositions in the operations that 
the method prescribes that we perform on our considered judgments. The 
dispositional character of the adjustment procedure ensures that any 
reflectively endorsed disposition to adjustment, no matter how bizarre, will 
potentially count as legitimate. This is again implausible. Suppose that Joe 
happens to be robustly disposed, on noticing a conflict between his judgments 
about capital punishment, to form a novel (and substantively unconnected) 
                                                   
22 For future-Tuesday indifference, see (Parfit 1984, pp. 123-4); for the claim that ‘formal’ 
ethical judgments (such as the transitivity of value) are especially trustworthy, see 
(Huemer 2008, p. 386).  
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belief about the moral value of art. And suppose that Joe is inclined to 
reflectively endorse that transition as reasonable. Joe’s exercising this 
disposition is an appropriate object of pity, not methodological endorsement. 
The possibility of psychologically robust irrational dispositions is no 
mere philosopher’s fantasy. For example, some ordinary reasoners are robustly 
inclined to endorse irrational inference patterns such as the gambler’s fallacy 
(Stich and Nisbett 1980, pp. 192-3). Our confidence in the irrationality of such 
inferences stems from our possession of rationally compelling arguments 
against them. However, the fact that these arguments are rationally compelling 
does not guarantee that they would be psychologically effective when 
addressed to those tempted to the gambler’s fallacy.23 Further, the 
fallaciousness of arguments in favor of the gambler’s fallacy does not guarantee 
those arguments to be psychologically ineffective (Stich and Nisbett 1980 pp. 
196-7).  Thus, it may be empirically plausible that straightforwardly 
objectionable principles of reasoning such as the gambler’s fallacy could 
survive into a wide reflective equilibrium, on the dispositional account. 
The task of a moral methodology is in part to theorize substantive and 
procedural irrationality in ethical enquiry. As this discussion shows, the 
method of reflective equilibrium instead embraces many clear instances of 
such irrationality as legitimate, provided those instances are psychologically 
robust. Beyond this substantive implausibility, however, the method also defers 
to our dispositions in an objectionably arbitrary way.  
Both in its account of inputs and of revision, the method does impose 
constraints on our dispositions. For example, consistency is a success 
constraint on the equilibrating operations proposed by the method. As 
Timothy Williamson (2007, pp. 244-6) points out, in appealing to logical 
relations like consistency, the method appeals to philosophically contestable 
evidence. This raises the pressing question: if we are allowed to appeal to such 
                                                   
23 Embarrassing autobiographical analogy: in my teens, I lost a little money to a friend who 
clearly explained the correct reasoning about the Monty Hall case to me, and then, in the 
face of my intransigence, goaded me into gambling on it.  
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evidence here, why can we not also appeal to such evidence to override an 
agent’s dispositions to endorse future Tuesday indifference, or the gambler’s 
fallacy? A similar point applies to the method’s account of inputs. Moral 
judgments are ruled out as inputs if made about cases where one stands to 
gain. This is an objective constraint; it will apply whether one is disposed to 
endorse it or not. Besides raising the arbitrariness worry just mentioned, this 
constraint also appears to be an ossified rule of thumb, which is clearly 
objectionable in many cases. For example, it implausibly requires us to 
discount judgments about oppression made by the oppressed (compare Kelly 
and McGrath 2010, pp. 348-9 for this point).  
 In this section, I have argued that despite giving very little guidance 
where it is most needed, Rawlsian methodology manages to be highly 
implausible. The methodological theory underlying the method is dubious 
because it proposes the method as a way to investigate a theoretical object – a 
psychology in wide reflective equilibrium – that likely has no determinate 
character. The method itself is objectionable, because it appeals repeatedly to 
the subject’s dispositions exactly where normative substance is needed.  
 
6. The method without Rawlsian baggage? 
Many philosophers claim allegiance to reflective equilibrium without intending 
to endorse either Rawls’ methodological theory, or the precise details of his 
method. It might thus seem possible that the basic proposal of assembling our 
considered judgments and seeking equilibrium between them could be 
salvaged by detaching them from the details of Rawls’ own articulation and 
defense. I cannot consider every possible effort of this kind here. Notably, I 
cannot rule out the possibility that someone could construct a compelling 
methodological theory that met my three desiderata, and in turn underwrote 
something resembling the Rawlsian method. In this section, I consider three 
related proposals, which strike me as the most initially inviting alternatives to 
that theoretically ambitious possibility. These involve replacing Rawls’ 
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problematic dispositional characterizations with normative ones, appealing to 
the inescapability of the method, and appealing to the idea that the method 
characterizes a distinctively subjective form of rationality. 
 To begin, notice that jettisoning Rawls’ methodological theory – the 
appeal to moral theory and wide reflective equilibrium – provides some relief 
from the challenges that I have posed. However, it does nothing to address the 
implausibility of the dispositional character of the method. One natural 
amendment here replaces Rawls’ dispositional characterization of considered 
judgment and revision with normative characterizations. On this approach, 
one might say that someone’s considered judgments are those judgments held 
by that person which it is reasonable to treat as starting points for theorization 
(whatever that comes to). And with those starting points in hand, one should 
deploy the reasonable canons of updating (whatever those are). 
This amendment avoids the final problem that I raised for the method. 
For example, the judgment that there is nothing wrong with future suffering, 
provided that it occurs on a Tuesday, could be dismissed as an unacceptable 
starting point. And it blunts the force of Williamson’s query about why the 
method is taking on some philosophically controversial views, while leaving 
others to be settled by the dispositions of the subject: the amended account 
potentially leaves nothing ‘up to the subject’ in this way.    
I have two (by now predictable) concerns about the method so revised. 
The first worry is that it is close to vacuous with respect to the Adjudication 
desideratum. Almost anyone who thinks successful moral enquiry is possible 
would agree that we ought to start with reasonable inputs, and then apply 
reasonable updating procedures. The central methodological debates in ethics 
can be characterized as concerning what counts as reasonable starting points 
and procedures. The second worry is that this version of the method has 
nothing helpful to say about the Vindication desideratum. Nothing in the 
proposal tells us whether we can successfully answer challenges to the 
possibility of successful normative ethical theorizing, or how.   
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A second suggestion sometimes made in defense of the method is that 
it is somehow inescapable. For example, T. M. Scanlon suggests that 
‘…apparent alternatives to [the method] are illusory.’ (2003, p. 149). This is a 
popular thought, but it is often hard to pin down what it is supposed to come 
to. In Scanlon’s case, it appears connected to the point I have emphasized in 
§4: that wide reflective equilibrium requires consideration of all reasonable 
arguments. In light of this, Scanlon suggests that the method ‘…allows for what 
might have been seen as alternative methods of justification to be incorporated 
within it’ (2003, p. 151). Indeed, according to Scanlon, the method ultimately ‘… 
becomes simply the truism that we should decide what views about justice to 
adopt by considering the philosophical arguments for all possible views and 
assessing them on their merits.’ (ibid.).  
 One might reasonably worry that the method was completely 
uninformative, if it was truly compatible with all competing methodologies. But 
Scanlon rejects this possibility. For example, he immediately notes that the 
method is inconsistent with a foundationalist method that singles out some 
subset of the considered judgments as unique bearers of prima facie 
justification (2003, p. 151). And earlier in the paper, Scanlon defends the 
justificatory status of considered moral judgments by appealing to something 
like his own metaethical quietism (2003, p. 146).  
Scanlon’s talk of “incorporating” alternatives thus needs to be read 
modestly. He can incorporate alternatives in the same attenuated sense that a 
coherentist about epistemic justification can “incorporate” foundationalism, by 
noting that most of us believe that our perceptual beliefs should be sensitive to 
our perceptual states (for example). In light of this, coherentism will entail that 
for most of us, beliefs about what our perceptual states are like will have an 
important justificatory role. But just as this does nothing to show that there is 
no alternative to coherentism, Scanlon’s point does not show that there is no 
alternative methodology to reflective equilibrium. In both cases, alternatives 
will consist in views on which the methodological significance of some feature 
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is not dependent on the subject’s psychology.24 If this is correct, the idea that 
the method is inescapable does not survive clarification. 
   A final attempt to defend (something like) the method of reflective 
equilibrium claims that it characterizes a hyper-subjective species of 
rationality. The core idea can be introduced by example. Consider Hapless who 
believes that suffering does not matter if it occurs on a future Tuesday. We, of 
course, see the substantive error of her ways. But she does not. She is as 
confident of this judgment as of any of her others. Arguments that her views 
rest on objectionably arbitrary distinctions leave her cold. Now consider two 
things that Hapless might do:  
1. Carefully make her set of moral judgments more informed and coherent, 
by her own lights.  
2. Transition – for no rationale that makes any antecedent sense to her – to 
what we recognize to be a more substantively reasonable set of moral 
judgments.  
The first transition appears characterized by a sort of rationality wholly lacking 
in the second transition. Hapless, reflecting carefully on these two possible 
futures can be expected to understand the first transition as an improvement, 
and the second as an alarming ethical conversion. Some defenders of reflective 
equilibrium seem to suggest that the method is worthy of allegiance because it 
describes this especially subjective sort of rationality.25  
 This way of defending the method commits it to the normative 
significance of such subjective perspectives, which is highly controversial. 
However, I will grant this controversial assumption for the sake of argument, in 
order to make two more modest points.  
                                                   
24 Note further that even if the method were inescapable in some stronger sense, this would 
fall short of showing that it was a credible way of forming ethical beliefs. Compare the idea 
that induction might be epistemically unjustified but psychologically irresistible. See 
(McPherson and Plunkett forthcoming) for discussion of related issues.  
25 I read (DePaul 1998, p. 301ff) as suggesting something like this idea, especially in his 
emphasis on how real alternatives to the method would require the enquiring subject to 
submit to an ‘alien authority’.  
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The first is that this strategy only vindicates something that resembles 
reflective equilibrium for subjects who are relatively normal. To see this, 
consider Hopeless, who (pace the method) confidently treats his moral 
judgments as most credible when they are unstable and formed in conditions 
conducive to bias. The hyper-subjectivist will now ask, against the proponent 
of the method: what is Hopeless to do, but privilege those judgments, on pain 
of (hyper-subjective) irrationality? Similar points apply to people who are 
certain that any reflective revision of their beliefs will tend to be unreliable and 
is hence to be avoided (for a relevant historical case, see Holton 1996). Again, 
hyper-subjective rationality will tell these people to avoid anything resembling 
the method. The key point here is that hyper-subjective rationality and 
reflective equilibrium (on any familiar description) easily come apart: all it 
takes is for someone to strongly endorse doing something directly inconsistent 
with the method.   
 My second point is that it is plausible to take normative ethics to be a 
public theoretical project. When seeking a moral methodology, we are 
arguably seeking a methodology for a shared enterprise, where that 
methodology may not always be perfectly acceptable to every potential 
enquirer. Rawls (to his credit) tends to characterize moral theory and 
philosophy as public rather than solipsistic projects throughout his work (see 
especially his (1951) and (1999a), but see his (1999b, p. 508) for a potentially 
conflicting claim). But it is bizarre to impose the norms of hyper-subjective 
rationality on any such public theoretical project. Compare the legitimacy of 
scientific researchers systematically ignoring the work of consistent cranks. 
 In this section, I have considered three attempts to salvage the method 
of reflective equilibrium by amending the method, and/or replacing Rawls’ 
own theoretical rationale for the method with some alternative. I have argued 
that redescribing considered moral judgments and the process of adjustment 
in bare normative terms leaves the hollow shell of a method, incapable of 
meeting the Vindication or Adjudication desiderata. I have also argued that 
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salient alternatives to Rawls’ underlying rationale for deploying the method 
fail. The failure of Rawls’ methodology thus extends beyond his particular 
characterization, and to salient attempts to defend closely related ideas.  
 
Conclusions 
In these conclusions, I do three things. I review the case against the method of 
reflective equilibrium. I offer a provocative diagnosis of its continuing 
influence despite its vices. And I close by sketching a framework for making 
progress in developing a methodology that fulfills the Vindication and 
Adjudication desiderata. 
  The core of this paper argued for three claims about Rawls’ reflective 
equilibrium methodology. First, this methodology fails to provide 
Vindication: it does not address the central challenges to the possibility of 
successful normative ethical theorizing. The role of moral theory in Rawls’ 
methodology at best permits his methodology to postpone, rather than answer, 
these challenges. Second, the method fails to provide Adjudication: it does 
not provide a non-trivial means of settling central debates within moral 
methodology. Rather, the method forces every enquirer to confront those 
debates piecemeal. Third, Rawlsian methodology fails to be Plausible. This is 
true of the theoretical framework that is supposed to motivate the method: the 
appeal to ideal psychologies in this framework makes the account less rather 
than more plausible. It is also true of the method itself: the role of dispositions 
in the account of the method’s starting points and procedures for revision are 
each hard to swallow in what is intended to be a normative proposal.  
 Many of these criticisms have been raised before. What accounts for the 
continued influence of Rawlsian methodology in the face of such criticism? I 
have two conjectures. The first is that it can be a moving target: presented with 
a criticism of some aspect of Rawls’ methodology, it is easy to imagine 
jettisoning that aspect, and retaining something that still appears recognizably 
Rawlsian. I have attempted to address this temptation in this paper by 
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systematically probing the many weaknesses of the methodology. I have also 
sought to highlight the poverty of natural attempts to salvage something 
distinctive without accepting the whole Rawlsian package.  
My second conjecture is less charitable. Philosophers working in ethics 
have been trained to approach ethical questions in a familiar range of 
distinctive ways. Suppose that one wants to continue doing so, without 
becoming bogged down in methodological enquiry. It is very convenient to be 
able to appeal to a method that (a) appears highly credible within the 
profession, and (b) appears on its face to license continuing doing what one 
was already doing.   
If the method were credible, such allegiance might be helpful. But 
because it is not, sanguine acceptance of the method has become a barrier to 
substantive progress in moral methodology, by providing the illusion that we 
have already achieved significant methodological success. Uncritical allegiance 
to the method also prevents ethicists from thinking clearly about their own 
enquiry, what they might reasonably hope to achieve by it, and what credible 
alternatives there might be to the approaches that they have been trained to 
use.  
Decisively rejecting the Rawlsian method thus clears the way for 
systematic enquiry into moral methodology: enquiry that aims to develop 
plausible unified methodological proposals that can Adjudicate central 
controversies within moral methodology, and Vindicate such enquiry in the 
face of skeptical challenge. I will close the paper on a constructive note, with 
the conjecture that we can hope to make progress in this project by focusing on 
two related questions:  
Q1: What is the nature of ethical thought and talk? 
Q2: What is our goal in engaging in ethical enquiry? 
The first question is the central question of metaethics. Focusing on this 
question is important because different metaethical views will provide us with 
different characterizations of the subject-matter that ethical enquiry is 
attempting to explore. And (to put it crudely) it is of great methodological 
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consequence whether that subject-matter is best understood by analogy to the 
subject-matter of sociology, or of mathematics, or of wine-tasting (see my 2012 
for more careful discussion). 
 Suppose that metaethical enquiry suggested that ethical thought and 
talk is about a certain class of mind-independent facts. This might seem to tell 
us that we should deploy methods apt for revealing those facts to us. However, 
this might be too quick. The second question mentioned above is important 
because many philosophers have taken the practical significance of ethical 
enquiry to suggest different sorts of goals for this enquiry. For example, some 
might want to discover ethical principles that have some sort of transcendental 
validity; others to find principles which we can justify to each other, others still 
to find principles whose practical implementation can be expected to have 
morally good effects.26  
 Clear focus on these two questions is important, because it is very hard 
to make significant arguments in ethics that do not implicitly commit one to 
ruling out some answers to these questions. On the one hand, recognition of 
this point is dialectically useful: some ethical theorists talk past each other, in 
light of presupposing different ranges of tenable answers to these questions. 
On the other, these questions are pressing for anyone interested in ethical 
theorizing, because neither debates about the correct metaethic, nor debates 
about the best goal for ethical theorizing are trivial. In light of this, practicing 
ethicists should care deeply about how consilient their approaches to ethical 
theorizing are with the range of significant answers to these two questions. 
 
                                                   
26 Interest in these goals for ethical enquiry is not always clearly distinguished from the 
suggestion that related phenomenon might play a role in constituting ethical facts. For 
discussion of the transcendental strategy that is sensitive to this issue, see (Shah 2010). The 
idea that the normative claims that we can justify to each other might be important even if 
they are not thereby true is most familiar in the context of political philosophy; for an 
especially clear statement of this idea, see (Estlund 2008, pp. 4-5). For the idea that moral 
methodology should provide practices of moral justification that satisfy various moral 
desiderata, see for example (Tobin and Jaggar 2013, §2). 
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